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With the advances in machine learning (ML) and deep learning (DL) techniques, and the
potency of cloud computing in offering services efficiently and cost-effectively, Machine
Learning as a Service (MLaaS) cloud platforms have become popular. In addition, there is
increasing adoption of third-party cloud services for outsourcing training of DL models,
which requires substantial costly computational resources (e.g., high-performance
graphics processing units (GPUs)). Such widespread usage of cloud-hosted ML/DL
services opens a wide range of attack surfaces for adversaries to exploit the ML/DL
system to achieve malicious goals. In this article, we conduct a systematic evaluation of
literature of cloud-hosted ML/DL models along both the important dimensions—attacks
and defenses—related to their security. Our systematic review identified a total of 31
related articles out of which 19 focused on attack, six focused on defense, and six focused
on both attack and defense. Our evaluation reveals that there is an increasing interest from
the research community on the perspective of attacking and defending different attacks on
Machine Learning as a Service platforms. In addition, we identify the limitations and pitfalls
of the analyzed articles and highlight open research issues that require further investigation.
Keywords: Machine Learning as a Service, cloud-hostedmachine learningmodels, machine learning security, cloud
machine learning security, systematic review, attacks, defenses
1 INTRODUCTION
In recent years, machine learning (ML) techniques have been successfully applied to a wide range of
applications, significantly outperforming previous state-of-the-art methods in various domains: for
example, image classification, face recognition, and object detection. These ML techniques—in
particular deep learning (DL)–based ML techniques—are resource intensive and require a large
amount of training data to accomplish a specific task with good performance. Training DLmodels on
large-scale datasets is usually performed using high-performance graphics processing units (GPUs)
and tensor processing units. However, keeping in mind the cost of GPUs/Tensor Processing Units
and the fact that small businesses and individuals cannot afford such computational resources, the
training of deep models is typically outsourced to clouds, which is referred to in the literature as
“Machine Learning as a Service” (MLaaS).
MLaaS refers to different ML services that are offered as a component of a cloud computing
services, for example, predictive analytics, face recognition, natural language services, and data
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modeling APIs. MLaaS allows users to upload their data and
model for training at the cloud. In addition to training, cloud-
hosted ML services can also be used for inference purposes, that
is, models can be deployed on the cloud environments; the system
architecture of a typical MLaaS is shown in Figure 1.
MLaaS1 can help reduce the entry barrier to the use of ML and
DL through access to managed services of wide hardware
heterogeneity and incredible horizontal scale. MLaaS is
currently provided by several major organizations such as
Google, Microsoft, and Amazon. For example, Google offers
Cloud ML Engine2 that allows developers and data scientists
to upload training data and model which is trained on the cloud
in the Tensorflow3, environment. Similarly, Microsoft offers
Azure Batch AI4,—a cloud-based service for training DL
models using different frameworks supported by both Linux
and Windows operating systems and Amazon offers a cloud
service named Deep Learning AMI (DLAMI)5 that provides
several pre-built DL frameworks (e.g., MXNet, Caffe, Theano,
and Tensorflow) that are available in Amazon’s EC2 cloud
computing infrastructure. Such cloud services are popular
among researchers as evidenced by the price lifting of
Amazon’s p2.16x large instance to the maximum
possible—two days before the deadline of NeurIPS 2017 (the
largest research venue on ML)—indicating that a large number of
users request to reserve instances.
In addition to MLaaS services that allow users to upload
their model and data for training on the cloud, transfer
learning is another strategy to reduce computational cost in
which a pretrained model is fine-tuned for a new task (using a
new dataset). Transfer learning is widely applied for image
recognition tasks using a convolutional neural network
(CNN). A CNN model learns and encodes features like
edges and other patterns. The learned weights and
convolutional filters are useful for image recognition tasks
in other domains and state-of-the-art results can be obtained
with a minimal amount of training even on a single GPU.
Moreover, various popular pretrained models such as AlexNet
(Krizhevsky et al., 2012), VGG (Simonyan and Zisserman,
2015), and Inception (Szegedy et al., 2016) are available for
download and fine-tuning online. Both of the aforementioned
outsourcing strategies come with new security concerns. In
addition, the literature suggests that different types of attacks
can be realized on different components of the
communication network as well (Usama et al., 2020a), for
example, intrusion detection (Han et al., 2020; Usama et al.,
2020b), network traffic classification (Usama et al., 2019), and
malware detection systems (Chen et al., 2018). Moreover,
adversarial ML attacks have also been devised for client-
side ML classifiers, that is, Google’s phishing pages filter
(Liang et al., 2016).
Contributions of the article: In this article, we analyze the
security of MLaaS and other cloud-hosted ML/DL models and
provide a systematic review of associated security challenges and
solutions. To the best of our knowledge, this article is the first
effort on providing a systematic review of the security of cloud-
hosted ML models and services. The following are the major
contributions of this article:
(1) We conducted a systematic evaluation of 31 articles related to
MLaaS attacks and defenses.
(2) We investigated five themes of approaches aiming to attack
MLaaS and cloud-hosted ML services.
(3) We examined five themes of defense methods for securing
MLaaS and cloud-hosted ML services.
(4) We identified the pitfalls and limitations of the examined
articles. Finally, we have highlighted open research issues that
require further investigation.
Organization of the article: The rest of the article is organized
as follows. The methodology adopted for the systematic
review is presented in Section 2. The results of the
systematic review are presented in Section 3. Section 4
presents various security challenges associated with cloud-
hosted ML models and potential solutions for securing cloud-
hosted ML models are presented in Section 5. The pitfalls and
limitations of the reviewed approaches are discussed in
Section 6. We briefly reflect on our methodology to
identify any threats to the validity in Section 8 and various
open research issues that require further investigation are
highlighted in Section 7. Finally, we conclude the article in
Section 9.
2 REVIEW METHODOLOGY
In this section, we present the research objectives and the adopted
methodology for the systematic review. The purpose of this article
is to identify and systematically review the state-of-the art
research related to the security of the cloud-based ML/DL
techniques. The methodology followed for this study is
depicted in Figure 2.
2.1 Research Objectives
The following are the key objectives of this article.
O1: To build upon the existing work around the security of
cloud-basedML/DLmethods and present a broad overview of the
existing state-of-the-art literature related to MLaaS and cloud-
hosted ML services.
O2: To identify and present a taxonomy of different attack and
defense strategies for cloud-hosted ML/DL models.
O3: To identify the pitfalls and limitations of the existing
approaches in terms of research challenges and opportunities.
2.2 Research Questions
To achieve our objectives, we consider answering two important
questions that are described below and conducted a systematic
analysis of 31 articles.
1We use MLaaS to cover both ML and DL as a Service cloud provisions.
2https://cloud.google.com/ml-engine/.
3A popular Python library for DL.
4https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/services/machine-learning-service/.
5https://docs.aws.amazon.com/dlami/latest/devguide/AML2_0.html.
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Q1: What are the well-known attacks on cloud-hosted/third-
party ML/DL models?
Q2: What are the countermeasures and defenses against such
attacks?
2.3 Review Protocol
We developed a review protocol to conduct the systematic review;
the details are described below.
2.3.1 Search Strategy and Searching Phase
To build a knowledge base and extract the relevant articles, eight
major publishers and online repositories were queried that
include ACM Digital Library, IEEE Xplore, ScienceDirect,
international conference on machine learning, international
conference on learning representations, journal of machine
learning research, neural information processing systems,
USENIX, and arXiv. As we added non-peer–reviewed articles
from electric preprint archive (arXiv), we (AQ and AI) performed
the critical appraisal using AACODS checklist; it is designed to
enable evaluation and appraisal of gray literature (Tyndall, 2010),
which is designed for the critical evaluation of gray literature.
In the initial phase, we queried main libraries using a set of
different search terms that evolved using an iterative process to
maximize the number of relevant articles. To achieve optimal
sensitivity, we used a combination of words: attack, poisoning,
Trojan attack, contamination, model inversion, evasion, backdoor,
model stealing, black box, ML, neural networks, MLaaS, cloud
computing, outsource, third party, secure, robust, and defense. The
combinations of search keywords used are depicted in Figure 3. We
then created search strategies with controlled or index terms given
in Figure 3. Please note that no lower limit for the publication date
was applied; the last search date was June 2020. The researchers (WI
and AI) searched additional articles through citations and by
snowballing on Google Scholar. Any disagreement was
adjudicated by the third reviewer (AQ). Finally, articles focusing
on the attack/defense for cloud-based ML models were retrieved.
2.3.2 Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria
The inclusion and exclusion criteria followed for this systematic
review are defined below.
2.3.2.1 Inclusion Criteria
The following are the key points that we considered for screening
retrieved articles as relevant for conducting a systematic review.
• We included all articles relevant to the research questions
and published in the English language that discusses the
attacks on cloud-based ML services, for example, offered by
cloud computing service providers.
• We then assessed the eligibility of the relevant articles by
identifying whether they discussed either attack or defense
for cloud-based ML/DL models.
• Comparative studies that compare the attacks and
robustness against different well-known attacks on cloud-
hosted ML services (poisoning attacks, black box attacks,
Trojan attacks, backdoor attacks, contamination attacks,
inversion, stealing, and invasion attacks).
• Finally, we categorized the selected articles into three
categories, that is, articles on attacks, articles on defenses,
and articles on attacks and defenses.
2.3.2.2 Exclusion Criteria
The exclusion criteria are outlined below.
• Articles that are written in a language other than English.
FIGURE 1 | Taxonomy of different defenses proposed for defending attacks on the third-party cloud-hosted machine learning (ML) or deep learning (DL) models.
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• Articles not available in full text.
• Secondary studies (e.g., systematic literature reviews,
surveys, editorials, and abstracts or short papers) are not
included.
• Articles that do not discuss attacks and defenses for cloud-
based/third-party ML services, that is, we only consider
those articles which have proposed an attack or defense for a
cloud-hosted ML or MLaaS service.
2.3.3 Screening Phase
For the screening of articles, we employ two phases based on the
content of the retrieved articles: 1) title and abstract screening and
2) full text of the publication. Please note that to avoid bias and to
ensure that the judgment about the relevancy of articles is entirely
based on the content of the publications, we intentionally do not
consider authors, publication type (e.g., conference and journal),
and publisher (e.g., IEEE and ACM). Titles and abstracts might
not be true reflectors of the articles’ contents; however, we
concluded that our review protocol is sufficient to avoid
provenance-based bias.
It is very common that the same work got published in
multiple venues, for example, conference papers are usually
extended to journals. In such cases, we only consider the
original article. In the screening phase, every article was
screened by at least two authors of this article that were
tasked to annotate the articles as either relevant, not relevant,
or need further investigation, which was finalized by the
discussion between the authors until any such article is either
marked relevant or not relevant. Only original technical articles
are selected, while survey and review articles are ignored. Finally,
all selected publications were thoroughly read by the authors for
categorization and thematic analysis.
3 REVIEW RESULTS
3.1 Overview of the Search and Selection
Process Outcome
The search using the aforementioned strategy identified a total of
4,384 articles. After removing duplicate articles, title, and abstract
screening, the overall number of articles reduced to 384. A total
of 230 articles did not meet the inclusion criteria and were
therefore excluded. From the remaining 154 articles, 123
articles did not discuss attack/defense for third-party cloud-
hosted ML models and were excluded as well. Of the remaining
articles, a total of 31 articles are identified as relevant. Reasons
for excluding articles were documented and reported in a
PRISMA flow diagram, depicted in Figure 4. These articles
were categorized into three classes, that is, articles that are
specifically focused on attacks, articles that are specifically
focused on defenses, and articles that considered both
attacks and defenses containing 19, 6, and 6 articles each,
respectively.
3.2 Overview of the Selected Studies
The systematic review eventually identified a set of 31 articles
related to cloud-based ML/DL models and MLaaS, which we
categorized into three classes as mentioned above and shown in
Figure 4. As shown in Figure 5, a significant portion of the
selected articles were published in conferences (41.94%);
comparatively, a very smaller proportion of these articles
were published in journals or transactions (19.35%). The
percentage of gray literature (i.e., non-peer–reviewed articles)
is 25.81%. Yet, a very small proportion of publications are
published in symposia (6.45%), and this percentage is the
same for workshop papers. The distribution of selected
FIGURE 2 | An illustration of a typical cloud-based ML or machine learning as a service (MLaaS) architecture.
FIGURE 3 | The methodology for systematic review.
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publications by their types over the years is shown in Figure 6.
The figure depicts that the interest in the security of cloud-
hosted ML/DL models increased in the year 2017 and was at a
peak in the year 2018 and was slightly lower in the year 2019 as
compared to 2018. Also, the majority of the articles during these
years were published in conferences. The distribution of selected
publications by their publishers over the years is depicted in
Figure 7, the figure shows that the majority of the publications
have been published at IEEE, ACM, and arXiv. There is a similar
trend in the number of articles in the year 2017, 2018, and 2019
as discussed previously.
3.3 Some Partially Related Non-Selected
Studies: A Discussion
We have described our inclusion and exclusion criteria that help
us to identify relevant articles. We note, however, that some
seemingly relevant articles failed to meet the inclusion criteria.
Here, we briefly describe few such articles for giving a rationale
why they were not included.
• Liang et al. (2016) investigated the security challenges for
the client-side classifiers via a case study on the Google’s
phishing pages filter, a very widely used classifier for
automatically detecting unknown phishing pages. They
devised an attack that is not relevant to the cloud-based
service.
• Demetrio et al. (2020) presented WAF-A-MoLE, a tool that
models the presence of an adversary. This tool leverages a set
of mutation operators that alter the syntax of a payload
without affecting the original semantics. Using the results,
the authors demonstrated that ML-basedWAFs are exposed
to a concrete risk of being bypassed. However, this attack is
not associated with any cloud-based services.
• Authors in Apruzzese et al. (2019) discussed adversarial
attacks where the machine learning model is compromised
to induce an output favorable to the attacker. These attacks
FIGURE 6 |Distribution of selected publications according to their types.
FIGURE 4 | Search queries used to identify publications to include in the
systematic review.
FIGURE 5 | Flowchart of systematic review and categorization.
FIGURE 7 | Distribution of selected publications by types over years.
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are realized in a different setting as compared to the scope of
this systematic review, as we only included the articles which
discuss the attack or defense when the cloud is outsourcing
its services as MLaaS.
• Han et al. (2020) conducted the first systematic study of the
practical traffic space evasion attack on learning-based
network intrusion detection systems; again it is out of the
inclusion criteria of our work.
• Chen et al. (2018) designed and evaluated three types of
attackers targeting the training phases to poison our
detection. To address this threat, the authors proposed
the detection system, KuafuDet, and showed it
significantly reduces false negatives and boosts the
detection accuracy.
• Song et al. (2020) presented a federated defense approach
for mitigating the effect of adversarial perturbations in a
federated learning environment. This article can be
potentially relevant for our study as they address the
problem of defending cloud-hosted ML models; however,
instead of using a third-party service, the authors conducted
the experiments on a single computer system in a simulated
environment; therefore, this study is not included in the
analysis of this article.
• In a similar study, Zhang et al. (2019) presented a defense
mechanism for defending adversarial attacks on cloud-aided
automatic speech recognition (ASR); however, it is not
explicitly stated that the cloud is outsourcing ML services




In this section, we present the findings from the systematically
selected articles that aim at attacking cloud-hosted/third-party
ML/DL models.
4.1 Attacks on Cloud-Hosted Machine
Learning Models: Thematic Analysis
In ML practice, it is very common to outsource the training of
ML/DL models to third-party services that provide high
computational resources on the cloud. Such services enable
ML practitioners to upload their models along with training
data which is then trained on the cloud. Although such
services have clear benefits for reducing the training and
inference time; however, these services can easily be
compromised and to this end, different types of attacks against
these services have been proposed in the literature. In this section,
we present the thematic analysis of 19 articles that are focused on
attacking cloud-hosted ML/DL models. These articles are
classified into five major themes: 1) attack type, 2) threat
model, 3) attack method, 4) target model(s), and 5) dataset.
Attack type: A wide variety of attacks have been proposed in
the literature. These are listed below with their descriptions
provided in the next section.
• Adversarial attacks (Brendel et al., 2017);
• Backdoor attacks6 (Chen et al., 2017; Gu et al., 2019);
• Cyber kill chain–based attack (Nguyen, 2017);
• Data manipulation attacks (Liao et al., 2018);
• Evasion attacks (Hitaj et al., 2019);
• Exploration attacks (Sethi and Kantardzic, 2018);
• Model extraction attacks (Correia-Silva et al., 2018;
Kesarwani et al., 2018; Joshi and Tammana, 2019; Reith
et al., 2019);
• Model inversion attacks (Yang et al., 2019);
• Model-reuse attacks (Ji et al., 2018);
• Trojan attacks (Liu et al., 2018).
Threat model: Cloud ML attacks are based on different threat
models, with the salient types with examples are listed below.
• black box attacks (no knowledge) (Brendel et al., 2017; Chen
et al., 2017; Hosseini et al., 2017; Correia-Silva et al., 2018;
Sethi and Kantardzic, 2018; Hitaj et al., 2019);
• white box attacks (full knowledge) (Liao et al., 2018; Liu
et al., 2018; Gu et al., 2019; Reith et al., 2019);
• gray box attacks (partial knowledge) (Ji et al., 2018;
Kesarwani et al., 2018).
Attack method: In each article, a different type of method is
proposed for attacking cloud-hosted ML/DL models; a brief
description of these methods is presented in Table 1 and is
discussed in detail in the next section.
Target model(s): Considered studies have used different
MLaaS services (e.g., Google Cloud ML Services (Hosseini
et al., 2017; Salem et al., 2018; Sethi and Kantardzic, 2018),
ML models of BigML Platform (Kesarwani et al., 2018), IBM’s
visual recognition (Nguyen, 2017), and Amazon Prediction APIs
(Reith et al., 2019; Yang et al., 2019)).
Dataset: These attacks have been realized using different
datasets ranging from small size datasets (e.g., MNIST (Gu
et al., 2019) and Fashion-MNIST (Liu et al., 2018)) to large
size datasets (e.g., YouTube Aligned Face Dataset (Chen et al.,
2017), Project Wolf Eye (Nguyen, 2017), and Iris dataset (Joshi
and Tammana, 2019)). Other datasets include California
Housing, Boston House Prices, UJIIndoorLoc, and IPIN 2016
Tutorial (Reith et al., 2019), FaceScrub, CelebA, and CIFAR-10
(Yang et al., 2019). A summary of thematic analyses of these
attacks is presented in Table 1 and briefly described in the next
section.
4.2 Taxonomy of Attacks on Cloud-Hosted
Machine Learning Models
In this section, we present a taxonomy and description of
different attacks described above in thematic analysis. A
taxonomy of attacks on cloud-hosted ML/DL models is
depicted in Figure 8 and is described next.
6Backdoor attacks on cloud-hosted models can be further categorized into three
categories (Chen et al., 2020): 1) complete model–based attacks, 2) partial
model–based attacks, and 3) model-free attacks).
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TABLE 1 | Summary of the state-of-the art attack types for cloud-based/third-party ML/DL models.
Author(s) Attack type Method Target model
(s)
Threat model Data
(Brendel et al., 2017) Adversarial attack Presented a decision-based attack, i.e., the
boundary attack
Two ML classifiers from Clarifai.com, i.e., brand
and celebrity recognition
Black box Two datasets: Natural images and celebrities
(Saadatpanah et al.,
2019)
— Crafted adversarial examples for copyright
detection system
YouTube content ID and AudioTag copyright White box and
black box
N/A
(Hosseini et al., 2017) — Proposed two targeted attacks for video
labeling and shot detection
Google cloud video intelligence API Black box —
(Kesarwani et al., 2018) Extraction attack Used information gain to measure model
learning rate
Decision tree deployed on BigML platform Gray box Four BigML datasets, IRS tax pattern, GSS
survey, email importance, steak survey
(Correia-Silva et al.,
2018)
— Knowledge extraction by querying the model
with unlabeled data samples and then used
responses to create fake dataset and model
Three local CNN models for visual recognition
for facial expression, object, and crosswalk
classification and Microsoft Azure Emotion API
Black box Used three datasets for facial expression
recognition, object, and satellite crosswalk
classification
(Reith et al., 2019) — Performed model extraction attacks on the
homomorphic encryption-based protocol for
preserving SVR-based indoor localization
Support vector regressor (SVR) and SVM White box California housing, Boston house prices,
UJIIndoorLoc, and IPIN 2016 tutorial
(Joshi and Tammana,
2019)
— Proposed a variant of gradient driven adaptive
learning rate (GDALR) for stealing MLaaS
models
Used three different models Black box Iris, liver disease, and land satellite datasets
(Sethi and Kantardzic,
2018)
Exploration attack Presented a seed-explore-exploit framework for
generating adversarial samples
Google cloud prediction platform Black box 10 real-world datasets
(Gu et al., 2019) Backdoor attack Realized attack by poisoning training samples
and labels
MNIST and a U.S. street sign classifier,
i.e., Faster-RCNN with outsourced training and
transfer learning
White box MNIST and U.S. traffic signs dataset
(Chen et al., 2017) — Used poisoning strategies to realized a targeted
attack and proposed two types of backdoor
poisoning attacks
Two face recognition models, i.e., DeepID and
VGG-Face
Black box YouTube aligned face dataset
(Liu et al., 2018) Trojan attack Proposed stealth infection on neural network-
based Trojan attack
Cloud-based intelligent supply chain,
i.e., MLaaS
White box Fashion-MNIST
(Gong et al., 2019) — Proposed real-time adversarial example crafting
procedure
Voice/speech enabled devices and Google
Speech
Gray box Voice-command dataset
(Ji et al., 2018) Model reuse attack Presented empirical evaluation of model-reuse
attacks on primitive models and realizing attack
by generating semantically similar neighbors
and identifying salient features
Pretrained primitive models for speech
recognition, autonomous steering, face
verification, and skin cancer screening
Gray box Speech commands, udacity self-driving car
challenge, VGG Face2, and International Skin
Imaging Collaboration (ISIC) datasets
(Liao et al., 2018) Data manipulation
attack
Studied data manipulation attacks for stealthily
manipulating ML and DL models using transfer
learning and gradient descent
Cloud-hosted ML and DL models White box Enron spam and MINIST
(Sehwag et al., 2019) — Crafted out-of-distribution exploratory
adversarial examples to compromise ML/DL
models of Clarifai’s content moderation system
in the cloud
Cloud-hosted ML and DL models White box and
black box
MINIST, CIFAR, and ImageNet







































In recent years, DL models have been found vulnerable to
carefully crafted imperceptible adversarial examples
(Goodfellow et al., 2014). For instance, a decision-based
adversarial attack namely the boundary attack against two
black box ML models trained for brand and celebrity
recognition hosted at Clarifai.com are proposed in (Brendel
et al., 2017). The first model identifies brand names from natural
images for 500 distinct brands and the second model recognizes
over 10,000 celebrities. To date, a variety of adversarial examples
generation methods have been proposed in the literature so far,
the interesting readers are referred to recent surveys articles for
detailed taxonomy of different types of adversarial attacks
(i.e., Akhtar and Mian, 2018; Yuan et al., 2019; Qayyum
et al., 2020b; Demetrio et al., 2020).
4.2.2 Exploratory Attacks
These attacks are inference time attacks in which adversary
attempts to evade the underlying ML/DL model, for example,
by forcing the classifier (i.e., ML/DL model) to misclassify a
positive sample as a negative one. Exploratory attacks do not
harm the training data and only affects the model at test time.
A data-driven exploratory attack using the
Seed–Explore–Exploit strategy for evading Google’s cloud
prediction API considering black box settings is presented
in (Sethi and Kantardzic, 2018). The performance evaluation
of the proposed framework was performed using 10 real-
world datasets.
4.2.3 Model Extraction Attacks
In model extraction attacks, adversaries can query the deployed
ML model and can use query–response pair for compromising
future predictions and also, they can potentially realize privacy
breaches of the training data and can steal the model by learning
extraction queries. In Kesarwani et al. (2018), the authors
presented a novel method for quantifying the extraction
status of models for users with an increasing number of
queries, which aims to measure model learning rate using
information gain observed by query and response streams of
users. The key objective of the authors was to design a cloud-
based system for monitoring model extraction status and
warnings. The performance evaluation of the proposed
method was performed using a decision tree model deployed
on the BigML MLaaS platform for different adversarial attack
scenarios. Similarly, a model extraction/stealing strategy is
presented by Correia-Silva et al. (2018). The authors queried
the cloud-hosted DLmodel with random unlabeled samples and
used their predictions for creating a fake dataset. Then they used
the fake dataset for building a fake model by training an oracle
(copycat) model in an attempt to achieve similar performance as
of the target model.
4.2.4 Backdooring Attacks
In backdooring attacks, an adversary maliciously creates the
trained model which performs as good as expected on the users’
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input samples. The backdooring attacks on deep neural networks
(DNNs) are explored and evaluated in (Gu et al., 2019). The
authors first explored the properties of backdooring for a toy
example and created a backdoor model for handwritten digit
classifier and then demonstrated that backdoors are powerful for
DNN by creating a backdoor model for a United States street sign
classifier. Where, two scenarios were considered, that is,
outsourced training of the model and transfer learning where
an attacker can acquire a backdoor pretrained model online. In
another similar study (Chen et al., 2017), a targeted backdoor
attack for two state-of-the art face recognition models, that is,
DeepID (Sun et al., 2014) and VGG-Face (Parkhi et al., 2015) is
presented. The authors proposed two categories of backdooring
poisoning attacks, that is, input–instance–key attacks and
pattern–key attacks using two different data poising strategies,
that is, input–instance–key strategies and pattern–key strategies,
respectively.
4.2.5 Trojan Attacks
In Trojan attacks, the attacker inserts malicious content into the
system that looks legitimate but can take over the control of the
system. However, the purpose of Trojan insertion can be varied,
for example, stealing, disruption, misbehaving, or getting
intended behavior. In Liu et al. (2018), the authors proposed a
stealth infection on neural networks, namely, SIN2 to realize a
practical supply chain triggered neural Trojan attacks. Also, they
proposed a variety of Trojan insertion strategies for agile and
practical Trojan attacks. The proof of the concept is demonstrated
by developing a prototype of the proposed neural Trojan attack
(i.e., SIN2) in Linux sandbox and used Torch (Collobert et al.,
2011) ML/DL framework for building visual recognition models
using the Fashion-MNIST dataset.
4.2.6 Model-Reuse Attacks
In model-reuse attacks, an adversary creates a malicious model
(i.e., adversarial model) that influences the host model to
misbehave on targeted inputs (i.e., triggers) in extremely
predictable fashion, that is, getting a sample classified into
specific (intended class). For instance, experimental evaluation
of model-reuse attacks for four pretrained primitive DL models
(i.e., speech recognition, autonomous steering, face verification,
and skin cancer screening) is evaluated by Ji et al. (2018).
4.2.7 Data Manipulation Attacks
Those attacks in which training data are manipulated to get
intended behavior by the ML/DL model are known as data
manipulation attacks. Data manipulation attacks for stealthily
manipulating traditional supervised ML techniques and logistic
regression (LR) and CNNmodels are studied by Liao et al. (2018).
In the attack strategy, the authors added a new constraint on fully
connected layers of the models and used gradient descent for
retraining them, and other layers were frozen (i.e., were made
non-trainable).
4.2.8 Cyber Kill Chain–Based Attacks
Kill chain is a term used to define steps for attacking a target
usually used in the military. In cyber kill chain–based attacks, the
cloud-hosted ML/DL models are attacked, for example, a high-
FIGURE 8 | Distribution of selected publications by publishers over years.
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level threat model targeting ML cyber kill chain is presented by
Nguyen (2017). Also, the authors provided proof of concept by
providing a case study using IBM visual recognition MLaaS
(i.e., cognitive classifier for classification cats and female lions)
and provided recommendations for ensuring secure and
robust ML.
4.2.9 Membership Inference Attacks
In a typical membership inference attack, for given input data and
black box access to the ML model, an attacker attempts to figure
out if the given input sample was the part of the training set or
not. To realize a membership inference attack against a target
model, a classificationmodel is trained for distinguishing between
the predictions of the target model against the inputs on which it
was trained and that those on which it was not trained (Shokri
et al., 2017).
4.2.10 Evasion Attacks
Evasion attacks are inference time attacks in which an adversary
attempts to modify the test data for getting the intended outcome
from the ML/DL model. Two evasion attacks against
watermarking techniques for DL models hosted as MLaaS
have been presented by Hitaj et al. (2019). The authors used
five publicly available models and trained them for distinguishing
between watermarked and clean (non-watermarked) images, that
is, binary image classification tasks.
4.2.11 Model Inversion Attacks
In model inversion attacks, an attacker tries to learn about
training data using the model’s outcomes. Two model
inversion techniques have been proposed by Yang et al.
(2019), that is, training an inversion model using auxiliary set
composed by utilizing adversary’s background knowledge and
truncation-based method for aligning the inversion model. The
authors evaluated their proposed methods on a commercial
prediction MLaaS named Amazon Rekognition.
5 TOWARD SECURING CLOUD-HOSTED
MACHINE LEARNING MODELS (Q2)
In this section, we present the insights from the systematically
selected articles that provide tailored defense against specific
attacks and report the articles that along with creating attacks
propose countermeasure for the attacks for cloud-hosted/third-
party ML/DL models.
5.1 Defenses for Attacks on Cloud-Hosted
Machine Learning Models: Thematic
Analysis
Leveraging cloud-basedML services for computational offloading
and minimizing the communication overhead is accepted as a
promising trend. While cloud-based prediction services have
significant benefits, however, by sharing the model and the
training data raises many privacy and security challenges.
Several attacks that can compromise the model and data
integrity, as described in the previous section. To avoid such
issues, users can download the model andmake inferences locally.
However, this approach has certain drawbacks, including,
confidentiality issues, service providers cannot update the
models, adversaries can use the model to develop evading
strategies, and privacy of the user data is compromised. To
outline the countermeasures against these attacks, we present
the thematic analysis of six articles that are focused on defense
against the tailored attacks for cloud-hosted ML/DL models or
data. In addition, we also provide the thematic analysis of those
six articles that propose defense against specific attacks. These
articles are classified into five major themes: 1) attack type, 2)
defense, 3) target model(s), 4) dataset, and 5) measured outcomes.
The thematic analysis of these systematically reviewed articles
that are focused on developing defense strategies against attacks is
given below.
Considered attacks for developing defenses: The defenses
proposed in the reviewed articles are developed against the
following specific attacks.
• Extraction attacks (Tramèr et al., 2016; Liu et al., 2017);
• Inversion attacks (Liu et al., 2017; Sharma and Chen, 2018);
• Adversarial attacks (Hosseini et al., 2017;Wang et al., 2018b;
Rouhani et al., 2018);
• Evasion attacks (Lei et al., 2020);
• GAN attacks (Sharma and Chen, 2018);
• Privacy threat attacks (Hesamifard et al., 2017);
• ide channel and cache-timing attacks (Jiang et al., 2018);
• Membership inference attacks (Shokri et al., 2017; Salem
et al., 2018).
Most of the aforementioned attacks are elaborated in
previous sections. However, in the selected articles that are
identified as either defense or attack and defense articles, some
attacks are specifically created, for instance, GAN attacks, side
channel, cache-timing attack, privacy threats, etc. Therefore, the
attacks are worth mentioning in this section to explain the
specific countermeasures proposed against them in the defense
articles.
Defenses against different attacks: To provide resilience against
these attacks, the authors of selected articles proposed different
defense algorithms, which are listed below against each type of
attack.
• Extraction attacks: MiniONN (Liu et al., 2017), rounding
confidence, differential, and ensemble methods (Tramèr
et al., 2016);
• Adversarial attacks: ReDCrypt (Rouhani et al., 2018) and
Arden (Wang et al., 2018b);
• Inversion attacks: MiniONN (Liu et al., 2017) and image
disguising techniques (Sharma and Chen, 2018);
• Privacy attacks: encryption-based defense (Hesamifard
et al., 2017; Jiang et al., 2018);
• Side channel and cache-timing attacks: encryption-based
defense (Hesamifard et al., 2017; Jiang et al., 2018);
• Membership inference attack: dropout and model stacking
(Salem et al., 2018).
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TABLE 2 | Summary of attack types and corresponding defenses for cloud-based/third-party ML/DL models.
Author Attack Defense Target model Data Measured outcomes
(Liu et al., 2017) Extraction attack and
inversion attack
MiniONN: a defense against information
leakage in DNN to transform into an
oblivious NN
Cloud-hosted DL models, neural network
for cloud-based prediction services
MNIST and CIFAR-10 Response latency and message sizes
(Rouhani et al.,
2018)
Adversarial attacks ReDCrypt: reconfigurable hardware-
accelerated framework for the privacy-
preserving
Cloud-hosted DL models MNIST and MovieLens Throughput
(Wang et al., 2018b) — Arden: To distribute DNN model
computation among edge device and
cloud data centers




— Incorporating randomness to video
analysis algorithms
Google cloud video intelligence API Videos comprising of adversarial
examples




Inversion attack and GAN
attack
Image disguising techniques to ensure the
protection against model-based
adversarial attacks




Privacy threats due to raw
cloud data
Homomorphic encryption to preserve the
privacy and integrity of data in DNN
Cloud-based DNN Crab dataset, fertility dataset, climate
dataset
Accuracy and training time
(Jiang et al., 2018) Side channel and cache-
timing attack
Secure logistic encryption along with
hardware-based security enhancement
by exploiting software guard extensions
Cloud-hosted LR models Edinburgh MI, WI-Breast cancer, and
MONK’s prob
Area under the curve, complexity, and
model training time
(Lei et al., 2020) Evasion attack Pelican: similarity-based analysis of
unknown website with the known
phishing Web site
BitDefender’s partical processing hosted
on cloud
PhishTank, PhishNet Similarity index
(Tramèr et al., 2016) Extraction attack Rounding confidences to some precision,
differential privacy to protect training data
elements, ensemble methods
MLmodels hosted on BigML and amazon 102 categories flower dataset, face
dataset, iris dataset, and traffic signs
dataset
Success rate given the perturbation
budget
(Shokri et al., 2017) Membership inference
attack
Top k class model predictions, increase
entropy, regularization and reducing
precision of prediction vector
MLaaS classification models of Google
and Amazon APIs
CIFAR-10,purchases, locations, Texas
hospital stays, MNIST, UCI adults
Accuracy and precision
(Salem et al., 2018) — Dropout and model stacking to prevent
overfitting
Google cloud prediction API Used eight different datasets Precision and recall
(Wang et al., 2018a) Misclassification attacks Neuron distance model, ensemble
method, dropout randomization
Google cloud ML, microsoft cognitive
toolkit (CNTK), and the PyTorch
102-Class VGG flower, face dataset, iris
dataset, and traffic signs dataset,
Google’s InceptionV3






































Target model(s): Different cloud-hosted ML/DL models have
been used for the evaluation of the proposed defenses, as shown in
Table 2.
Dataset(s) used: The robustness of these defenses have been
evaluated using various datasets ranging from small size datasets
(e.g., MNIST (Liu et al., 2017; Wang et al., 2018b; Rouhani et al.,
2018; Sharma and Chen, 2018)) and CIFAR-10 (Liu et al., 2017;
Wang et al., 2018b; Sharma and Chen, 2018)), to large size
datasets (e.g., Iris dataset (Tramèr et al., 2016), fertility and
climate dataset (Hesamifard et al., 2017), and breast cancer
(Jiang et al., 2018)). Other datasets include Crab dataset
(Hesamifard et al., 2017), Face dataset, Traffic signs dataset,
Traffic signs dataset (Tramèr et al., 2016), SVHN (Wang et al.,
2018b), Edinburgh MI, Edinburgh MI, WI-Breast Cancerband
MONKs Prob (Jiang et al., 2018), crab dataset, fertility dataset,
and climate dataset (Hesamifard et al., 2017). Each of the defense
techniques discussed above is mapped in Table 2 to the specific
attack for which it was developed.
Measured outcomes: The measured outcomes based on which
the defenses are evaluated are response latency and message sizes
(Liu et al., 2017; Wang et al., 2018b), throughput comparison
(Rouhani et al., 2018), average on the cache miss rates per second
(Sharma and Chen, 2018), AUC, space complexity to
demonstrate approximated storage costs (Jiang et al., 2018),
classification accuracy of the model as well as running time
(Hesamifard et al., 2017; Sharma and Chen, 2018), similarity
index (Lei et al., 2020), and training time (Hesamifard et al., 2017;
Jiang et al., 2018).
5.2 Taxonomy of Defenses on Cloud-Hosted
Machine Learning Model Attacks
In this section, we present a taxonomy and summary of different
defensive strategies against attacks on cloud-hosted ML/DL
models as described above in thematic analysis. A taxonomy
of these defenses strategies is presented in Figure 9 and is
described next.
5.2.1 MiniONN
DNNs are vulnerable to model inversion and extraction attacks.
Liu et al. (2017) proposed that without making any changes to the
training phase of the model it is possible to change the model into
an oblivious neural network. They make the nonlinear function
such as tanh and sigmoid function more flexible, and by training
the models on several datasets, the authors demonstrated
significant results with minimal loss in the accuracy. In
addition, they also implemented the offline precomputation
phase to perform encryption incremental operations along
with the SIMD batch processing technique.
5.2.2 ReDCrypt
A reconfigurable hardware-accelerated framework is proposed
by Rouhani et al. (2018), for protecting the privacy of deep
neural models in cloud networks. The authors perform an
innovative and power-efficient implementation of Yao’s
Garbled Circuit (GC) protocol on FPGAs for preserving
privacy. The proposed framework is evaluated for different
FIGURE 9 | Taxonomy of different attacks realized on the third-party cloud-hosted machine learning (ML) or deep learning (DL) models.
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DL applications, and it has achieved up to 57-fold throughput
gain per core.
5.2.3 Arden
To offload the large portion of DNNs from the mobile devices to
the clouds and to make the framework secure, a privacy-
preserving mechanism Arden is proposed by Wang et al.
(2018b). While uploading the data to the mobile-cloud
perturbation, noisy samples are included to make the data
secure. To verify the robustness, the authors perform rigorous
analysis based on three image datasets and demonstrated that this
defense is capable to preserve the user privacy along with
inference performance.
5.2.4 Image Disguising Techniques
While leveraging services from the cloud GPU server, the
adversary can realize an attack by introducing malicious
created training data, perform model inversion, and use the
model for getting desirable incentives and outcomes. To
protect from such attacks and to preserve the data as well as
the model, Sharma and Chen (2018) proposed an image
disguising mechanism. They developed a toolkit that can be
leveraged to calibrate certain parameter settings. They claim
that the disguised images with block-wise permutation and
transformations are resilient to GAN-based attack and model
inversion attacks.
5.2.5 Homomorphic Encryption
For making the cloud services of outsourced MLaaS secure,
Hesamifard et al. (2017) proposed a privacy-preserving
framework using homomorphic encryption. They trained the
neural network using the encrypted data and then performed
the encrypted predictions. The authors demonstrated that by
carefully choosing the polynomials of the activation functions to
adopt neural networks, it is possible to achieve the desired accuracy
along with privacy-preserving training and classification.
In a similar study, to preserve the privacy of outsourced
biomedical data and computation on public cloud servers,
Jiang et al. (2018) built a homomorphically encrypted model
that reinforces the hardware security through Software Guard
Extensions. They combined homomorphic encryption and
Software Guard Extensions to devise a hybrid model for the
security of the most commonly used model for biomedical
applications, that is, LR. The robustness of the Secure LR
framework is evaluated on various datasets, and the authors
also compared its performance with state-of-the-art secure LR
solutions and demonstrated its superior efficiency.
5.2.6 Pelican
Lei et al. (2020) proposed three mutation-based evasion attacks
and a sample-based collision attack in white-, gray-, and black
box scenarios. They evaluated the attacks and demonstrated a
100% success rate of attack on Google’s phishing page filter
classifier, while a success rate of up to 81% for the
transferability on Bitdefender TrafficLight. To deal with such
attacks and to increase the robustness of classifiers, they proposed
a defense method known as Pelican.
5.2.7 Rounding Confidences and Differential Privacy
Tramèr et al. (2016) presented the model extraction attacks
against the online services of BigML and Amazon ML. The
attacks are capable of model evasion, monetization, and can
compromise the privacy of training data. The authors also
proposed and evaluated countermeasures such as rounding
confidences against equation-solving and decision tree
pathfinding attacks; however, this defense has no impact on
the regression tree model attack. For the preservation of
training data, differential privacy is proposed; this defense
reduces the ability of an attacker to learn insights about the
training dataset. The impact of both defenses is evaluated on the
attacks for different models, while the authors also proposed
ensemble models to mitigate the impact of attacks; however, their
resilience is not evaluated.
5.2.8 Increasing Entropy and Reducing Precision
The training of attack using shadow training techniques against
black box models in the cloud-based Google Prediction API and
Amazon MLmodels are studied by Shokri et al. (2017). The attack
does not require prior knowledge of training data distribution. The
authors emphasize that in order to protect the privacy of medical-
related datasets or other public-related data, countermeasures
should be designed. For instance, restriction of prediction vector
to top k classes, which will prevent the leakage of important
information or rounding down or up the classification
probabilities in the prediction. They show that regularization
can be effective to cope with overfitting and increasing the
randomness of the prediction vector.
5.2.9 Dropout and Model Stacking
In the study by Salem et al. (2018), the authors created three
diverse attacks and tested the applicability of these attacks on
eight datasets from which six are similar as used by Shokri et al.
(2017), whereas in this work, news dataset and face dataset is
included. In the threat model, the authors considered black box
access to the target model which is a supervised ML classifier with
binary classes that was trained for binary classification. To
mitigate the privacy threats, the authors proposed a dropout-
based method which reduces the impact of an attack by randomly
deleting a proportion of edges in each training iteration in a fully
connected neural network. The second defense strategy is model
stacking, which hierarchically organizes multiple ML models to
avoid overfitting. After extensive evaluation, these defense
techniques showed the potential to mitigate the performance
of the membership inference attack.
5.2.10 Randomness to Video Analysis Algorithms
Hosseini et al. designed two attacks specifically to analyze the
robustness of video classification and shot detection (Hosseini
et al., 2017). The attack can subtly manipulate the content of the
video in such a way that it is undetected by humans, while the
output from the automatic video analysis method is altered.
Depending on the fact that the video and shot labels are
generated by API by processing only the first video frame of
every second, the attack can successfully deceive API. To deal
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with the shot removal and generation attacks, the authors
proposed the inclusion of randomness for enhancing the
robustness of algorithms. However, in this article, the authors
thoroughly evaluated the applicability of these attacks in different
video setting, but the purposed defense is not rigorously
evaluated.
5.2.11 Neuron Distance Threshold and Obfuscation
Transfer learning is an effective technique for quickly building
DL student models in which knowledge from a Teacher model
is transferred to a Student model. However, Wang et al.
(2018a) discussed that due to the centralization of model
training, the vulnerability against misclassification attacks
for image recognition on black box Student models
increases. The authors proposed several defenses to mitigate
the impact of such an attack, such as changing the internal
representation of the Student model from the Teacher model.
Other defense methods include increasing dropout
randomization which alters the student model training
process, modification in input data before classification,
adding redundancy, and using orthogonal model against
transfer learning attack. The authors analyzed the
robustness of these attacks and demonstrated that the
neuron distance threshold is the most effective in
obfuscating the identity of the Teacher model.
6 PITFALLS AND LIMITATIONS
6.1 Lack of Attack Diversity
The attacks presented in the selected articles have limited scope
and lack diversity, that is, they are limited to a specific setting, and
the variability of attacks is limited as well. However, the diversity
of attacks is an important consideration for developing robust
attacks from the perspective of adversaries, and it ensures the
detection and prevention of the attacks to be difficult. The
diversity of attacks ultimately helps in the development of
robust defense strategies. Moreover, the empirical evaluation
of attack variabilities can identify the potential vulnerabilities
of cybersecurity systems. Therefore, to make a more robust
defense solution, it is important to test the model robustness
under a diverse set of attacks.
6.2 Lack of Consideration for Adaptable
Adversaries
Most of the defenses in the systematically reviewed articles are
proposed for a specific attack and did not consider the adaptable
adversaries. On the other hand, in practice, the adversarial attacks
are an arms race between attackers and defenders. That is, the
attackers continuously evolve and enhance their knowledge and
attacking strategies to evade the underlying defensive system.
Therefore, the consideration of adaptable adversaries is crucial for
developing a robust and long-lasting defense mechanism. If we do
not consider this, the adversary will adapt to our defensive system
over time and will bypass it to get the intended behavior or
outcomes.
6.3 Limited Progress in Developing
Defenses
From the systematically selected articles that are collected from
different databases, only 12 articles have presented defense
methods for the proposed attack as compared to the articles
that are focused on attacks, that is, 19. In these 12 articles, six have
only discussed/presented a defense strategy and six have
developed a defense against a particular attack. This indicates
that there is limited activity from the research community in
developing defense strategies for already proposed attacks in the
literature. In addition, the proposed defenses only mitigate or
detect those attacks for which they have been developed, and
therefore, they are not generalizable. On the contrary, the
increasing interest in developing different attacks and the
popularity of cloud-hosted/third-party services demand a
proportionate amount of interest in developing defense
systems as well.
7 OPEN RESEARCH ISSUES
7.1 Adversarially Robust Machine Learning
Models
In recent years, adversarial ML attacks have emerged as a major
panacea for ML/DL models and the systematically selected articles
have highlighted the threat of these attacks for cloud-hostedMl/DL
models as well. Moreover, the diversity of these attacks is drastically
increasing as compared with the defensive strategies that can pose
serious challenges and consequences for the security of cloud-
hosted ML/DL models. Each defense method presented in the
literature so far has been shown resilient to a particular attack
which is realized in specific, settings and it fails to withstand for yet
stronger and unseen attacks. Therefore, the development of
adversarially robust ML/DL models remains an open research
problem, while the literature suggests that worst-case robustness
analysis should be performed while considering adversarial ML
settings (Qayyum et al., 2020a; Qayyum et al., 2020b; Ilahi et al.,
2020). In addition, it has been argued in the literature that most of
ML developers and security incident responders are unequipped
with the required tools for securing industry-grade ML systems
against adversarial ML attacks Kumar et al. (2020). This indicates
the increasing need for the development of defense strategies for
securing ML/DL models against adversarial ML attacks.
7.2 Privacy-Preserving Machine Learning
Models
In cloud-hosted ML services, preserving user privacy is
fundamentally important and is a matter of high concern.
Also, it is desirable that ML models built using users’ data
should not learn information that can compromise the privacy
of the individuals. However, the literature on developing privacy-
preserving ML/DL models or MLaaS is limited. On the other
hand, one of the privacy-preserving techniques that have been
used for privacy protection for building a defense system for
cloud-hosted ML/DL models, that is, the homomorphic
encryption-based protocol (Jiang et al., 2018), has been shown
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vulnerable to model extraction attack (Reith et al., 2019).
Therefore, the development of privacy-preserving ML models
for cloud computing platforms is another open research problem.
7.3 Proxy Metrics for Evaluating Security
and Robustness
From systematically reviewed literature on the security of cloud-
hosted ML/DL models, we orchestrate that the interest from the
research community in the development of novel security-centric
proxy metrics for the evaluation of security threats and model
robustness of cloud-hosted models is very limited. However, with
the increasing proliferation of cloud-hosted ML services
(i.e., MLaaS) and with the development/advancements of
different attacks (e.g., adversarial ML attacks), the
development of effective and scalable metrics for evaluating
the robustness ML/DL models toward different attacks and
defense strategies is required.
8 THREATS TO VALIDITY
We now briefly reflect on our methodology in order to identify
any threats to the validity of our findings. First, internal validity is
maintained as the research questions we pose in Section 2.2
capture the objectives of the study. Construct validity relies on a
sound understanding of the literature and how it represents the
state of the field. A detailed study of the reviewed articles along
with deep discussions between the members of the research team
helped ensure the quality of this understanding. Note that the
research team is of diverse skills and expertise in ML, DL, cloud
computing, ML/DL security, and analytics. Also, the inclusion
and exclusion criteria (Section 2.3) help define the remit of our
survey. Data extraction is prone to human error as is always the
case. This was mitigated by having different members of the
research team review each reviewed article. However, we did not
attempt to evaluate the quality of the reviewed studies or validate
their content due to time constraints. In order to minimize
selection bias, we cast a wide net in order to capture articles
from different communities publishing in the area of MLaaS via a
comprehensive set of bibliographical databases without
discriminating based on the venue/source.
9 CONCLUSION
In this article, we presented a systematic review of literature that is
focused on the security of cloud-hosted ML/DL models, also
named as MLaaS. The relevant articles were collected from eight
major publishers that include ACM Digital Library, IEEE Xplore,
ScienceDirect, international conference on machine learning,
international conference on learning representations, journal
of machine learning research, USENIX, neural information
processing systems, and arXiv. For the selection of articles, we
developed a review protocol that includes inclusion and exclusion
formulas and analyzed the selected articles that fulfill these
criteria across two dimensions (i.e., attacks and defenses) on
MLaaS and provide a thematic analysis of these articles across five
attack and five defense themes, respectively. We also identified
the limitations and pitfalls from the reviewed literature, and
finally, we have highlighted various open research issues that
require further investigation.
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